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STATE OF UTAH
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\
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f

Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant

STATEMENT OF FACT
This is a wrongful death case.
Maurice Bruce Crarvoz was struck and killed by an automobile driven by the defendant. The collision occurred about
7:00 P.M. on the evening of October 26, 1959, at the intersection of 17th South and 19th East Streets in Salt Lake City.
At the time Charvoz was walking south across 17th South in
the pedestrian crosswalk paralleling 19th East on the west
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side, the defendant was driving east on 17th South m the
south traffic lane.
Seventeenth South at this point is a blacktop street 37
feet 2 inches wide. A traffic division line is marked on the road
20 feet 8 inches from the north curb and 16 feet 6 inches from
the south curb. The pedestrian lane on the west side of 19th
East was 8 feet wide and clearly marked. A street light projects
into the street on the southwest corner of the intersection. At
the time of the collision the weather was clear, the roads were
dry and the evening was fairly dark (R. 4-12). Attached hereto
marked Appendix "A" (Ex. P. 1) is a diagram of the intersection with certain pertinent measurements marked there as
testified to in the case by Officer Diaz, the investigating officer.
On the evening of the accident Bruce Charvoz was an
unmarried man 25 years of age. He resided with his parents
and worked with his mother in a business known as the Salt
Lake Shirt Shop. During his childhood he had suffered from
encephalitis, which had left him with impaired muscular coordination. There is a dispute in the evidence as to whether
or not the disease had also affected his mental capacity. However, that dispute is not material to this appeal.
Shortly prior to the accident Bruce had left the Highland
Stake Meeting House located on 19th East north of 17th South.
He was seen by witnesses D. Ford Crandall and Mrs. Crandall
to enter 17th South in the crosswalk (R. 84, 87, 88). He
proceeded south until he was struck at a point 26 feet 11
inches from the north curb and 10 feet 3 inches from the south
curb. Cottrell at the time was driving his car east on 17th
South. Cottrell estimated his speed at from 30 to 35 miles
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per hour. His speed was estimated at 42 miles per hour by
the investigating officer. However, the question of speed is not
one of the points relied upon in this appeal. The defendant
testified that he first saw Bruce when the automobile was 60
feet from the point of impact and Bruce was approximately
6 feet from the point of impact. The defendant testified that
at the time he first saw Bruce, Bruce was walking at a normal
gait as he continued to do with his head down, apparently
oblivious of the approach of the automobile (R. 123, 128).
The defendant did not sound his horn, nor did he turn his
car from a direct path (R. 139). He applied his brakes and
laid down skid marks averaging 14 feet in length before the
point of impact and 56 feet after impact (Ex. P. 1). Bruce's
body was knocked or carried 49 feet 6 inches. He died on
the day after the collision as a result of the injuries received.
This case was tried before a jury in the Court of the
Third District Judge Aldon J. Anderson. The jury returned
a verdict of no cause of action. The plaintiff moved for a new
trial in the Court below based upon the errors hereinafter set
forth. The moton for new .trail was denied.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
The plaintiff and appellant relies upon the following
points in seeking a reversal of the verdict in the Court below
and a new trial of the issues:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 TO THE
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EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 TO THE
JURY IN REGARD TO THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
CHANCE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 TO THE
EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 2 read as follows:
"You are instructed that the evidence establishes,
as a matter of law that the defendant was negligent
and that his negligence proximately contributed to the
death of the decedent, therefore, you should :find the
the issues of liability against the defendant and in favor
of the plaintiff unless you should also find that the
decedent was contributorily negligent and that such
negligence on the part of the decedent proximately
contributed to his death."
The Court refused to give this instruction.
The plaintiff was entitled to this instruction only if the
undisputed evidence established that the defendant was negligent in one or more particulars. A number of grounds of
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negligence were relied upon by the plaintiff as set forth in
the pretrial order. On some of these grounds the evidence is
in dispute. On others, there is no dispute. In fact, they are
established by the defendant's own testimony. The plaintiff
maintained that the defendant was driving at an excessive
speed. As to this issue, the evidence is in conflict. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to have
his automobile under propert control. Here too, there is a
conflict in evidence. It was alleged that the defendant's automobile was not equipped with proper and sufficient brakes.
There is little evidence from the plaintiff on this point. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing
to give the decedent a warning of his approach. There is a
conflict in the evidence as to whether or not. the defendant
had sufficient time to do this after actually discovering the
presence of the decedent. There is no dispute. in the evidence,
however, as to the remaining two grounds of. negligence relied
upon by the plaintiff:
A. The defendant failed to keep a proper lookout and
B. The defendant failed to yield the right of way to the
decedent.
Under the defendant's own testimony he .first saw Bruce
when Bruce was 6 feet from the point of impact and the automobile 60 feet from the point of impact (R. 136). Bruce
continued to walk at a set pace until the collision. (R. 139).
This establishes that Bruce was walking approximately 3
miles per hour which the Court can take judicial notice is a
normal gait. Bruce had proceeded 26 feet 11 inches into the
intersection when the impact occurred (Ex. P. 1) establishing
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that the defendant's car was approximately 270 feet west of the
crosswalk when Bruce entered the street. The defendant
testified that his lights were burning and were adjusted in
accordance with the law under the provisions of Section 416-134 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1953 (R. 146). The lights
must therefore have been able to pick up anyone in the road
at a distance of 100 feet. When the defendant's automobile
was 100 feet from the point of impact, Bruce was already
more than 16 feet into the street and was almost to the center
line. He was walking at a normal gait. The defendant did
not see Bruce at this point but saw him only when the automobile was 60 feet from the point of impact. However, at
either the time at which the defendant should have seen Bruce
or the time he did see Bruce, Bruce was within the crosswalk
and was approaching so closely from the opposite half of the
roadway as to be in danger under the provisions of Section
41-6-78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. It was the obligation of
the defendant to yield the right of way. The evidence is clear
that he did not do it.
The defendant's own witness, Sergeant Pitcher, testified
on cross examination that had the defendant seen Bruce at 100
feet and assuming a speed of 30 miles per hour as testified
to by the defendant, the defendant could have brought his
car to a stop before ever reaching the crosswalk (R. 165).
The defendant tried to excuse his failure to see Bruce
earlier by claiming that the corner post of his automobile
blocked the view (R. 136). The uncontradicted testimony of
the Witness Tipton, an engineer, however, was that the angle
of vision of the automobile in question was sufficient so that
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at 60 feet from the point of impact the defendant could not
only have seen Bruce where he was walking, but could see clear
to the curb on the north side of the street and at 100 feet from
the point of impact he could see a considerable distance to the
north of the curb (R. 170, Ex. P. 11). Under these circumstances, therefore, there can be no jury question but that the
failure of the defendant to see Bruce when the defendant was
100 feet from the point of impact was due to no other cause
than negligent inattention. Had he seen him at that point, he
could have brought his car to a stop before ever reaching the
crosswalk. This negligent inattention, therefore, was a proximate contributing cause of the accident. Furthermore, there
can be no dispute but that under the Statutes of the State of
Utah the right of way belonged to the pedestrian and it was
negligence on the part of the motorist who failed to yield it.
Such failure to yield obviously was a proximate contributing
cause to the accident.
The question of the defendant's negligence, therefore,
should not have been left to the jury. The only matters which
should have been left to the jury was the question of the contributory negligence of the pedestrian and the question of
damages.
The matter of taking the question of negligence from the
deliberation of the jury was passed upon by this Court in the
case of Frank v. McCarty, 188 P.2d 737. Although the matter
there concerned was the question of contributory negligence,
the principles are the same. The Court stated:
"However, if reasonable minds would not be warranted in reaching any conclusion other than that
plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence in light
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of the plaintiff's own testimony or other undisputed
fact, there is no jury question but a question of law
for the Court."
Plaintiff therefore represents that the lower Court erred in
leaving to the jury the question of defendant's negligence and
in refusing to instruct the jury that the defendant was negligent
as a matter of law.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 TO THE
JURY IN REGARD TO THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
Plaintiff does not bear such a heavy burden in regard to
Point II as was the case under Point I above. Under Point I
we were entitled to the requested instruction if, but only if,
the defendant was clearly guilty of negligence either under
his own evidence or under the undisputed and incontrovertible
evidence in the case. In regard to Point II we were entitled
to have the requested instruction given if there was evidence
in the record from which the jury could have made an affirmative finding as to each of the conditions giving rise to the
doctrine of last clear chance. Graham v. Johnson, 166 P.2d
230 at Page 238.
Our requested instruction was copied verbatim from Page
63 and 64 of the Uniform Jury Instructions of Utah. This
instruction covers the last clear chance doctrine applicable
to the situation where the plaintiff is not in a position of helpless peril but was by reason of inattention or lack of alertness
moving into a position of danger without realizing the poten-
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tial peril. The instruction sets forth six propositions that must
be met by the evidence in order for the jury to apply the
doctrine of last clear chance. This case appears to be a classic
example for the application of the last clear chance as it applies
to a negligently inattentive plaintiff. Let us examine each
one of the six conditions to see how the evidence here fits.
The first condition that must be met is that the plaintiff
must have been in a position of danger. Certainly this cannot
be doubted. The plaintiff was in the roadway in a pedestrian
crosswalk moving at a speed which, unless something were
done to change the situation, would bring him into direct
collision with the automobile.
Secondly, the evidence must establish that the person
injured was by reason of inattention or lack of proper alertness
totally unaware of the peril that threatened to him. We have
only to look at the defendant's own testimony to establish
this proposition. He testified that Bruce was walking with his
head down paying no attention to the approaching automobile (R. 128).
In the third place we must establish that the defendant
actually saw the plaintiff and knew of his perilous position.
The defendant's own testimony is that he actually saw the
plaintiff and knew of his perilous position when the automobile
was 60 feet from the point of impact.
The fourth proposition which we must establish is that
the defendant then realized, or by the exercise of due care
should have realized, that Bruce was unaware of the danger.
Once again we need look only to the defendant's own testimony.
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The defendant testified that Bruce was walking at a steady
gait, not looking at all at the car but walking directly into the
path of it (R. 128). Certainly, the jury could well have found,
in fact would almost be forced to find, that the defendant
in the exercise of reasonable care should have recognized that
Bruce was unaware of the danger.
As a fifth proposition we must establish that at such time
there existed an opportunity in the defendant by the exercise
of ordinary care to have avoided the collision. The defendant
first saw Bruce at a distance of 60 feet. At the speed at which
he was going at the time the application of his brakes would
not have stopped him before he reached the point of impact.
The time that the brakes should have been applied was at a
distance of 100 feet, at which time he could have seen Bruce
had he been looking. However, when the defendant observed
the peril at 60 feet he could have done one of two things to
have avoided the accident-he could have sounded his horn,
or he could have turned slightly to the right and thus have
avoided the collision entirely. He did neither of these things
but continued straight ahead (R. 139) . When the defendant
first saw Bruce, Bruce was not in front of the car, although it
was evident that he was going to be there unless he stopped
walking. He was, however, at that time some four to six feet
left of the automobile. A mere touch of the horn might have
brought him up sharply before he ever entered the path of the
automobile. Whether or not there was time to sound the horn
and time for Bruce to stop was under all the circumstances
a jury question. Furthermore, it appears clear that there was
an opportunity for the defendant himself to have avoided
the accident merely by turning to the right. He, himself,
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admitted that there were 10 feet of unobstructed roadway
between the point of impact and the curb (R. 140). By turning
to the right he could have missed Bruce by 4 feet and yet not
have struck the curb.
As a sixth proposition we must prove that the defendant
negligently failed to avail himself of the opportunity to avoid
the accident. The defendant himself admitted that he neither
sounded his horn nor changed direction of the car (R. 139).
Some earlier cases have held that the last clear chance
doctrine based upon the negligent inattention theory is not
applicable where the injured party is still moving when the
peril is discovered by the defendant and also. when the collision
occurs. This is not the rule in this state, however, nor is it the
rule in the majority of jurisdictions elsewhere. In the case
of Graham v. Johnson, 166 Pac. 2d, 230, the injured person
was running westerly out of the roadway at the time he was
struck. The court none the less held the doctrine of last clear
chance applicable. In the case of Morby v. Rogers, 250 Pac.
2d, 231, the injured party was riding a bicycle along the side
of the road. Here also the Court held the doctrine to be
applicable. In dismissing the fact that the boy on the bicycle
was moving at the time of the accident, Judge Wolfe in his
concurring opinion stated:
"It was not a case of a rapid change of relative positions of two fast moving vehicles. The cycling boy
was riding a comparatively slow-moving vehicle. This
circumstance alone may give rise to a situation where
it is incumbent on the jury to determine in respect to
that vehicle whether the comparatively more rapid one
had the clear opportunity to avoid the accident or
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m1t1gate 1t 1nto a possible minor collision. Certainly
the vehicle which comes with the potentiality for substantial damage, as stated by Mr. Justice McDonough,
owes a duty toward a lad on a frail vehicle which duty
may not be discharged by the application of logic
alone."
The situation in this case is remarkably like that in Morby
v. Rogers, except that here the evidence is much stronger in
favor of the giving of a last clear chance instruction. In the
Morby case the defendant did sound his horn one time. In this
case he never did sound it at all. Likewise, in the Graham
v. Johnson supra, the basis of the holding of the Court that
the defendant could have avoided the collision was the failure
to blow a horn. In the case now before the Court, there was
much greater opportunity for the blowing of the horn than
there was in the Graham v. Johnson case. Here the defendant
was aware for 60 feet that Bruce was moving into the path
of his vehicle. In the Johnson case Darlene Johnson moved
only a very few feet between the time the boy started to run
from his set pbsition in the street until he was struck.
The facts in this case fall squarely within the provision
of Section 480 of the Restatement of Torts. There was clearly
evidence from which the jury could have found that the last
clear chance doctrine was applicable. It was, therefore, error
for the Court to refuse to give this instruction.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that the failure of the Court to give the
two requested instructions was error which substantially preju-

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

diced the rights of the plaintiff. The case should be sent back
for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
CALVIN L. RAMPTON
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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